User:Mohammad adil/sandbox12
Siege of Emesa | |||||||
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Part of Muslim conquest of Syria Byzantine-Arab Wars | |||||||
Present days Emesa | |||||||
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Belligerents | |||||||
Rashidun Caliphate | Byzantine empire. | ||||||
Commanders and leaders | |||||||
Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah Khalid ibn al-Walid | Harbees | ||||||
Strength | |||||||
15,000 | 8000 | ||||||
Casualties and losses | |||||||
235 | 4,900 |
Siege of Emesa was laid by the forces of Rashidun Caliphate from December 635-March 636, which resulted in the Islamic conquest of Emesa, a major trading city of Byzantine empire in Levant.
Background
[edit]After decisive victory at Battle of Ajnadayn Muslim army after a long siege Conquered Damascus in September 634 A.D, they continued there march to wards north and in late 635 A.D Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah sent Khalid ibn Walid with his mobile guard to laid the siege of Emesa and later joined him with the main body of army. Because of the continues victories of Muslims the Byzantine garrisons of Emesa and Qinnasrin made a truce, it was agreed that Emessa would pay 10,000 dinars and deliver 100 robes of brocade, and in return the Muslims would not attack Emessa for one year. If, however, any Roman reinforcements arrived to strengthen Emessa, the truce would become invalid. The gates of Emessa were opened as soon as the truce was signed, and thereafter there was free movement of Muslims in and out of the market of Emesa,advancing the major byzantine towns. The garrison of Qinnasrin (the ancient Calchis) made the truce on the same terms. But both governors, of Emesa and Qinnasrin, made the truce for reasons of expediency. Both hoped that their garrisons would before long be reinforced by Heraclius, and as soon as that happened they would resume hostilities against the Muslims.[1] Accept the cities of Qinassareen and Emesa Muslim armies raided many cities of northern Syria major towns of Hama Shaizar, Afamia (known today as Qalatul-Muzeeq) and Ma'arra Hims (now Ma'arrat-un-Numan) One by one surrendered in peace to the Muslims and agreed to pay the Jizya.
It was while the Muslims were at Shaizar that they heard of reinforcements moving to Qinnasrin and Emesa. The truce was thus violated by the Byzantine garrison. The arrival of winter gave the Byzantine garrison a further assurance of success. In their forts they would be better protected from the cold than the Muslim Arabs, who were not used to intense cold, and with only their tents to give them shelter would suffer severely from the Syrian winter.[2]
Heraclius wrote to Harbees, the military governor of Emessa:
“ | The food of these people is the flesh of the camel and their drink its milk. They cannot stand the cold. Fight them on every cold day so that none of them is left till the spring. | ” |
The siege
[edit]Abu Ubaidah decided to take Emessa first, and thus clear his rear from the enemy before undertaking more serious operations in Northern Syria. Consequently the Muslim army marched to Emesa with Khalid's mobile guard in the lead. On arrival at the city a short battle was fought between Khalid ibn Walid's mobile guard and Byzantine garrison of Emesa, Muslims drove them back and the Romans withdrew into the fort and closed the gates, Abu Ubaidah ibn al-Jarrah arrived with the rest of the army and deployed it in four groups opposite the four gates of Emesa:
- Masdud Gate (to the southwest)
- Tadmur Gate (to the north-east)
- Duraib Gate (to the east)
- Hud Gate (to the west)
Emesa was a circular fortified city with a diameter of rather less than a mile, and it was surrounded by a moat. There was also a citadel atop a hillock inside the fort. Outside the city stretched a fertile plain, broken only on the west by the River Orontes.[3] Abu Ubaidah himself, together with Khalid and his mobile guard, camped on the north side, a short distance from the Rastan Gate. Abu Ubaidah left the conduct of the siege in the hands of Khalid, who thus acted as the virtual commander of the Muslims for this operation. It was now late November or early December, and the winter was at its peak. The siege continued. Every day there would be an exchange of archery, but no major action took place which could lead to a decision either way. The Byzantine expectations that the Muslims would not be able to withstand the cold of Emesa were proved to be correct to some extant, but not as they imagned.[4]. It was about the middle of March 636 the worst of the winter was over, when Harbees decided to make a surprise sally and defeat the Muslims in battle outside the fort, as the Byzantine hope of the cold driving the Muslims away vanished, Supplies were running low, and with the coming of spring and better weather the Muslims would receive further reinforcements and would then be in an even stronger position. Early one morning the Rastan Gate was flung open and Harbees led 5,000 men into a quick attack on the unsuspecting Muslim army facing that gate. The speed and violence of the attack took the Muslims by surprise, and although this was the largest of the four groups positioned at the four gates, it was driven back from the position where it had hastily formed up for battle.[5] A short distance back the Muslims reformed their front and held the attack of the Byzantines, but the pressure became increasingly heavy and the danger of a break-through became clearly evident. Abu Ubaidah sent Khalid ibn Walid to restore the situation. Khalid moved forward with the Mobile guard, took the hard pressed Muslims under his command and redisposed the Muslim army for battle, after all this defensive measures Khalid took the offensive and steadily pushed the Romans back, though it was not till near sunset that the Romans were finally driven back into the fort. The sally had proved unsuccessful.
Conquest of Emesa
[edit]The following morning Abu Ubaidah held a council of war and expressed his dissatisfaction with the manner in which the Muslims had given way before the Roman attack, whereupon Khalid remarked:
“ | These Romans were the bravest i had ever met. | ” |
Abu Ubaidah asked Khalid for his advise and Khalid gave his plan that the next morning there will be fake withdrawl of army from Emesa giving the impression to the Byzantines that the Muslims are raising the siege and withdrawing to the south and they will surely attack the rearguard withdrawing Muslim army and at that moment the army will turn back encircle the Byzantine army and will inhiliate them.[6]
According to the plan, early the following morning, the Muslims raised the siege and withdrawing to the south, viewing it as a brilliant military opportunity Harbees immediately collected 5,000 Byzantine warriors and led them out of the fort to chase the Muslims, he launched his mounted force into a fast pursuit to catch up with the retreating Muslim forces and strike them down as they fled. The Byzantine army caught up with the Muslims a few miles from Emesa, the leading elements of Byzantine cavalry were about to pounce upon the 'retreating Muslims' when the Muslims suddenly turned and struck at the Byzantines with ferocity. As the Muslims turned on the Byzantines, Khalid shouted a command at which two mounted groups detached themselves from the Muslim army, galloped round the flanks of the surprised Byzantines and charged from the rear. Steadily and systematically the Muslims closed in from all sides. It is said that Khalid with a small group of elite mounted warriors of Mobile guard reached to the centre of the Byzantines army and here he saw Harbees still fighting, Khalid made for Harbees, but was intercepted by a gaint Byzantines general, who was killed by Khalid after an interesting duel. At the time when the Muslims started their attack on the encircled Romans, a group of 500 horsemen under Maaz ibn Jabal had galloped back to Emesa to see to it that no escaping Roman got into the fort. As these horsemen neared Emesa, the terrified inhabitants and the remnants of the Roman garrison which had not joined the pursuit hastily withdrew into the fort and closed the gates. Maaz deployed his men in front of the gates to prevent the Byzantines in Emesa from coming out and the Byzantines outside Emessa from getting in.[7] It is recorded that only about a hundred Byzantines got away. The Muslims, on the other hand, lost about 235 dead in the entire operation against Emesa, from the beginning of the siege to the end of the last action. As soon as this action was over the Muslims returned to Emesa and resumed the siege. The local inhabitants offered to surrender on terms, and Abu Ubaidah accepted the offer. This happened around the middle of March, 636. The inhabitants paid the Jizya at the rate of one dinar per man, and peace returned to Emesa.[8]
Aftermaths
[edit]Soon after the surrender of Emesa, the Muslims set out once again for the north, intending to take the whole of Northern Syria this time, including Aleppo and Antioch. They went past Hama and arrived at Shaizar. Here a Roman convoy taking provisions to Qinasarin and escorted by a small body of soldiers was intercepted and captured by Khalid. The prisoners were interrogated, and they provided the information regarding the plan of Heraclius, and concentration of a large Byzantine army at Antioch. This Byzantine army met the Muslims in August 636 at the plain of Yarmouk where the Muslims won a decisive victory against the Byzantines at Battle of Yarmouk.
References
[edit]- ^ Akram, A. I. The Sword of Allah: Khalid bin al-Waleed, His Life and Campaigns, Nat. Publishing House. Rawalpindi, 1970. ISBN 0-71010-104-X
- ^ Tarikh al-Tabari:Vol. 3, page. 96-97.
- ^ Damascus and Palmyra: a journey to the East. With a sketch of the state and ... By Charles Greenstreet Addison, Published by Adamant Media Corporation
- ^ [1]
- ^ The Byzantine And Early Islamic Near East By Hugh N. Kennedy, Published by Ashgate Publishing, Ltd.
- ^ Waqidi: page. 103
- ^ http://www.sacred-texts.com/cla/gibbon/05/daf05018.htm
- ^ Waqidi: page. 104